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) 
[So }i'. No. 22643. In Bank. May 14,1969.] 
FIELD RESEARCH CORPORATION et al., Petitioners, 
V. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE CITY AND 
COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Respondent; WIL-
LIAM P. PATRICK, Real Party in Interest. 
[1] Appeal- Decisions Appealable - Part of Judgment: Manda-
mus-Vacating Judgments and Orders.-In an action for dam-
ages for false and malicious defamation by statements in 
press conferences or interviews with broadcasting media, an 
order granting defendant's motion under Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 437c, for summary" judgment to the extent of precluding 
plaintiffs' recovery of general and exemplary damages was 
not appealable, was one for which plaintiffs had no plain, 
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, 
and was thus one subject to vacation by writ of mandate 
where the order was based" on an improper application of Civ. 
Code, § 48a, providing that only special damages are recover-
able for libel by newspaper or slander by radio broadcast 
unless a correction is first demanded and refused. " 
[2] Libel and Slander-Mitigation-Correction.-Civ. Code, § 48a, 
providing that only special, as opposed to general and ~xem­
plary, damages are recoverable for libel by newspaper or 
slander by radio broadcast unless a correction is first demanded 
[2] Validity, construction, and application of statute limiting 
damages recoverable for defama.tion, note, 13 A.L.R..2d 277. See also 
Cal.Jur.2d, Libel and Slander, § 119 et seq; Am.Jur., Libel and 
Slander (1st ed § 218). 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal, § 25; Mandamus, § 57; [2; 
3] Libel and Slander, § 27. 
( 
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and refused, protects only those actually engaged in the news 
dissemination industry (disapproving Farr v. Bramblett (1955) 
132 Cal.App.2d 36 [281 P.2d 372], Larrick v. GiliootJ, (1959) 
176 Cal.App.2d 408 [1 Cal.Rptr. 360] and Howard v. Southern 
Cal. etc. Newspapers (1950) 95 Cal.App.2d 580 [213 P.2d 399] 
to the extent that those cases would extend the application of 
the statute to nonparticipants in publishing and broadcasting 
enterprises) . 
[3] Id.-Mitigation~orrection.--Civ. Code, § 48a, providing that 
only special, as opposed to general and exemplary, damages' 
are recoverable for libel by newspaper or slander by radio 
broadcast unless a correction is first demanded and refused, 
did not operate to protect a political candidate for alleged 
defamation of a research corporation, engaged in devising and 
conducting public opinion polls, and its president via the news 
media where such media were not the candidate's personal 
occupation or business. 
PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the Superior Court 
of the City and County of San Francisco to vacate an order 
granting defendant partial summary judgment in an action 
for damages for defamation. Writ granted. 
Haizlip, Ring, 0 'Donnell & Moore and David D. Ring for 
PetitJgners. 
No appearance for Respondent. 
Belli, ~she, Ellison, Choulos, Cone & Harper, von Berold-
ingen, Rohde & Noonan and James D. Rohde for Real Party 
in Interest. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Petitioners"Field Research Corporation 
and its president, Mervin D. Field, seek a writ of mandate to 
compel the Superior Court of the City and County of San 
Francisco to vacate its order granting partial summary judg-
ment in an action for damages for defamation. (Code Civ. 
Proc., § 437c.) [1] The court's order is not· appealable. 
Since petitioners have no "plain, 8peedy,and adequate 
remedy, in the ordinary course of law," and since the court 
. erred in refusing to permit petitioners to proceed to trial on 
the issue of general and exemplary damages, the writ will 
issue. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1086; Souza &- McC.ue Constr. Co. v. 
Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 508 [20 Cal. Rptr. 634, 370 
P.2d 338] ; Dowell v. Superior Court (1956) 47 Cal.2d 483, 
) 
) 
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486 [304 P.2d 1009]; 3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (1954) pp. 
2541-2542. ) 
Petitioners' complaint against William P. Patrick, real 
party in interest herein, alleged: Mervin D. Field is the presi-
dent of Field Research Corporation, which is engaged in 
devising and conducting public opinion polls and disseminat-
ing the results thereof to subscribers. One such poll, released 
in February 1966 and bearing Mervin D. Field's name, indi-
cated the degree of public preference for three Republican 
gubernatorial candidates, Ronald Reagan, George Christo-
pher, and William P. Patrick. On five specified occasions 
Patrick stated in press conferences or interviews with broad-
casting media that the foregoing poll was inaccurate and 
dishonest. 1 ' 
The complaint alleged that Patrick's statemeRts were false 
and made with malice and that petitioners were therefore 
entitled to recover special, general, and exemplary damages. 
Patrick moved for partial summary judgment. Since the 
statements complained of in paragraphs V, VI, and VII had 
been communicated to the public by news media and since no 
demands for correction had been served on the various media 
, 
IThe complaint alleged tllnt Patrick made the statements to representa-
tives of newspaper or broadcasting media with the intent that they be . 
communicated to the public. The statements complained of were set forth 
in paragraphs, which the parties stipulated should be the basis for :five 
separate causes of action, as follows: 
Paragraph IV: "I believe this poll was paid for by George Christopher 
and his forces. • . • I wonder who paid for it • • • I think we would 
find a very strong Christopher influence. • • . I'm of the knowledge that 
polls can be purchased." 
Paragraph V: "[The February poll] ,vaa corrupt .••• The poll was 
hought and paid for by George Christopher for $16,000. • . • The poll 
deliberately misrepresented my standing. • . ." 
Paragraph VI: "I think that [the February poll] was purchased by 
forces supporting Mr. Chri!ltopher and Iean't at this time prove this 
but I again have some reliable rumors and I think that this was the 
case.' , 
Parngraph VII: "[T]he poll was disbonest. I think it was designed 
to tie in with a deal made hy George Christopher and Reagan last Jnne 
... there is some indication that it has been [rigged] ... I ha.ve 
rumors from a very roliable sourcef 8] that it was and tha.t [Christopher] 
or his campaign war chest paid $16,000 to have the poll favor him ••• 
and this is dirty politics." 
Paragraph VIII does not quote Patrick but recites that he stated that 
George Christopber's forces paid Mervin D. Field $16,000 to make 
Cbristopher look good in the California Poll and that Pa~rick stated 
that a good friend had told him Utili. 
Although the complaint alleged that all five statements were made 
with the intent that they be communicated to the public, communication 
was only alleged with regard to the statements set out in paragraphs V 
and VI. The parties stipulated that the statements set out in paragraph 
VII were so communicated. 
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! 
that published the statements, the trial court granted Pat-
rick '8 motion on the ground that petitioners were precluded 
from recovering general or exemplary damages for those 
statements by section 48a of the Civil Code.2 
[2] The petition presents three questions: Does section 
48a protect third parties not engaged in the news dissemina-
tion industry whose statements are reported to the public by 
newspaper, radio, or television T Is the section constitutional if 
so applied? In any event, may petitioners recover general and 
exemplary damages for defamatory statements published to 
representatives of news media that did not thereafter publish 
the statements to the public even though other news media did 
publish the statements' Since we must answer the :first ques-
tion in the negative we do not reach the other two questions. 
Neither the language of the statute nor such extrinsic aids 
as are available make clear whether or not section 48a applies 
to third parties not engaged in the business of disseminating 
news. It was enacted in 1945, replacing a similar statute of 
equal ambiguity. 3 Section 48a closely resembles, and was 
~robably patterned after a Minnesota statute (Minn.Gen.Stat. 
~~1:j, § 7901; now Minn.Stat., § 548.06; see, Uhlman v. Farm 
8trfck &- Home Co. (1941) 126 Minn. 239 [148 N.'V. 102, 103, 
Ann.Cas. 1915D 888]; Anderson v. Hearst Publishing Co. 
(S.D.Cal. 1954) 120 F.Supp. 850, 853), which applied only to 
the news media and not to third parties whose statements 
were communicated to the public via the news media. (Ly-
diard v. Wingate (1915) 131 Minn. 355 [155 N.W. 212,213].) 
The language of section 48a indicates that the California 
2" 1. In any action for damages for the pUblication of a libel in a 
newspaper, or of a slander by radio broadcast, plaintiff shall recover no 
more than spel~ial dlu,nages unless a correction be demanded and be not 
published or broadcast, as hereinafter provided. Plaintiff shall serve upon 
the publisher; at the place of pUblication or broadcaster at the place of 
-broadcast, a written notice specifying the statements claimed to be libel-
ous and demanding that the same be corrected. . . ." 
"2. If a correction be demanded ... and be not published or broad-
cast • • . in said newspaper or on said broadcasting station • . . plain-
tift' . • .' may recover general, special and exemplary damages. . . ." 
•. ! Television broadcasts are included within the meaning of the term 
"radio broadcasts" as used in section 48a. (Civ. Code, § 48.5, subd. 
(4).) 
3 (8tats. 1931, ch. 1018, p. 2034, § 1.) The 1931 statute applied to "any 
. action for damages for the publication of a libel in a newspaper"; 
provided for service of a request that the offending material be "with-
drawn," such service to be made on the" publisher at the place of publi-
cation"; and provided for the recovery of "actual, special and exem-
plary damages" if the correction were not properly published in "said 
newspaper. ' , 
--~- ------_._ ... --- .. 
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statute, like the Minnesota statute, does not apply to third 
parties who are not participants in th~ publishing or broad-
casting enterprise. Although the word" publication" in the 
first sentence of that section is used in its legal sense to mean 
the communication of any defamation,4 the second sentence 
provides that the demand for correction shall be served upon 
the "publisher" or "broadcaster' 'and clearly refers to the 
owner or operator of the newspaper or radio station, rather 
than the originator of the defamatory statements. (PridonofJ 
v. Balokovich (1951) 36 Ca1.2d 788,791 [228 P.2d 6].) 
It does not follow, however, that because the newspaper 
publisher or radio broadcaster must be served with the 
demand for correction, section 48a applies only in those situ,. 
ations in which the publisher or broadcaster is himself the 
defendant or himself originated the defamatory statements. 
In Werner v. Southern Cal. etc. Newspapers (1950) 35 
Ca1.2d 121, 125-134 [216 P.2d 825, 13 A.L.R.2d 252], we held 
that section 48a could limit its protection to those who engag(' 
in the immediate dissemination of news on the ground that. 
the Legislature could reasonably conclude that such enter-. 
prises are most· often subject to unwarranted claims for 
excessive damages' in defamation suits, that they cannot. 
'always check their sources for accuracy and their stories for 
inadvertent publication errors, and that such enterprises are-
peculiarly well situated to publish effective retractions. 
Subsequently, in Pridonoff v. Balokovich, supra, we recog-
nized that the purpose of section 48a could be circumvented if 
the section were limited to newspaper publishers and radio 
broadcasters, and we therefore held that the section protected 
those who participated in the publication or broadcast, includ- ---
ing reporters, columnists, authors, critics, and editors. Other-' 
41n Pridonoff v. Balokovich (1951) 36 Ca1.2d 788, 791 [288 P.2d 6]. 
we emphasized the potentially unlimited application of the first sentence 
of section 48a, but we held only that the section applied to "partici· 
pant.s" in newspaper pUblications as well as to the publishers themselves. 
(See, Mercado v. Hoefler (1961) 190 Cal.App.2d 12, 18·19 [11 Cal.Rptr. 
787] [person whose stat.ements are made to a reporter and subsequently 
published is not protected by § 48a]; White v. Valenta (1965) 234 Cal. 
App.2d 243, 247-248 [44 Cal.Rptr. 241, 13 A.L.R.3d 1271] [§ 48a not 
applicable to one who merely intrudes upon a live television broadcast]; 
Comer v. Louisville 9' N.R. Co. (1907) 15 Ala. 622 [44 So. 676, 13 L.R.A. 
N.S. 525] [statute similar to § 48a held not applicable to advertisers].) 
To the extent that Farr v. Bramblett (1955) 132 Cal.App.2d 36 [281 
P.2d 372], Larrick v. Gilloon (1959) 176 Cal.App.2d 408 [1 Ca1.Rptr. 
360], and Hou:ard v. Southern Cal. etc. Newspapers (1950) 95 Cal.App.2d 
580 [213 P.2d 3991, would extend the application of section 48a to non· 
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wise, that section would protect, not those engaged in the 
rapid dissemination of news, but merely those who owned or 
operated the facilities for such dissemination; it would pro-
tect, not a special form of news reporting, but a spec~al form 
of investment. If without first demanding and being refused a 
l;"etraction, . plaintiffs could reach behind the publisher or 
broadcaster and sue \instead the offending reporter or other 
participant, section-4'Sa would serve little purpose and would 
actively discourage the very free and rapid dissemination of 
news it seeks to encourage. 
Furthermore, as we noted in Pridonoff, there is good reason 
for the section to designate the publisher or broadcaster as the 
party on whom notice to retract must be served. (Pridonoff v. 
Balokovich, supra, at p. 791; see Werner v. Southern Cal. etc. 
Newspapers, supra, at p. 133.) With respect to the defama-
tions that their employees or other participants have caused to 
be published' or broadcast, it is only the publisher or broad-
caster who has the power effectively to correct or retract. 
When a defamatory statement authored by a participant in a 
publishing or broadcasting enterprise has been published by a 
newspaper or broadcasting station, it is largely the authority 
and reputation of the paper or station that gives the state-
ment its credibility. Indeed, many news stories and editorials 
disseminated by either enterprise do not reveal the identity of 
the author and are accepted by the public as statements of the 
enterprise itself. Even when the participant is identified, the 
weight that the public will attach to his statement may be 
determined la.rgely by the reputation for truth and impar-
tiality that the enterprise itself enjoys . 
. [3] None of the reasons for applying section 48a to 
participants in news media apply to Patrick. At the time he 
made the statements complained of he was a private citizen 
. and candidate for public office and not a participant in a 
publishing or broadcasting ~nterprise. Patrick, as well as the 
statements he made, were themselves news. The fact that he 
was seen and his statements heard and recorded by repre-
sentatives of the news media does not make him a dissemi-
nator of news any more than any other person whose activities 
or utterances are reported by the media thereby becomes a 
disseminator of news. We realize, of course, that. the news 
value of Patrick's allegations was twofold. He made his 
accusations as a candidate and public figure. If the charges 
were true, it would certainly be news that the Field Poll had 
been "bought." There is a significant difference, however, 
J 
I 
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between one who occasionally discovers and makes public an· 
item that is newsworthy and one who, as a daily occupation or 
business, collects, collates, evaluates, reduces to communicable 
form, and communicatE's the news. It is these latter activities 
that the Legislature sought to protect by section 48a. 
The newspapers, radio stations, and television stations that 
reported Patrick's statements, and on whom notice to retract 
would have had to be served if section 48a were applicable, 
could not have corrected or retracted the statements effective-
ly. The media could hardly be required to deny that Patrick 
made the statements in question, and indeed may have had an 
independent privilege to publish them.5 At most they could 
disclaim any responsibility for them. Since they could not 
. speak for Patrick, however, such disclaimers would not miti-
gate the sting of the alleged defamation. 
Since section 48a does not apply to Patrick, the trial court 
erred in granting his motion for partial summary judgment. 
Let a peremptory writ of ·mandate issue directing the 
Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco to 
vacate its order of October 14, 1968, in the case of Field ,'. 
Patrick, action No. 564926, and to enter an order denying th(~ 
motion of defendant therein for partial summary judgment. 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J .. 
and Sullivan, J., concurred. 
oSee Civil Code, sections 47, subdivisions 3·5, 48.5. For examples oj 
situations where the author of a story and the publisher possess differen' 
privileges, see Davis v. Hearst (1911) 160 Cal. 143 [116 P. 530]; Gray 
bill v. DeYoung (1903) 140 Cal. 323, 328·329 [73 P. 1067]; DiGiorgi~ 
Corp. v. Valley Labor Citizen (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 268 [67 Cal 
Rptr. 82]. 
